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NOTES
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE LAW: A STATUTE
FOR ILLINOIS
INTRODUCTION

The real estate law of Illinois has recently been affected yet
again by the winds of change, or more appropriately, by ghosts in
the attic. In the summer of 1991, the purchaser of a Victorian
house in New York sued the seller based on the seller's failure to
disclose that the house was haunted.' In Stambovsky v. Ackley, the

purchaser argued that the poltergeists in his new home were a material element of the sale that should have been disclosed. 2 In holding for the plaintiff, the New York Supreme Court reasoned that
since the seller had previously publicized the existence of ghosts in
the home, the seller could not deny that the ghosts were a material
element affecting its value.3 The Stambovsky court held that nondisclosure was a sound basis for rescission of the sale since the
buyer could not have discovered the ghostly presence through rea4
sonable inspection.
Stambovsky, along with other decisions that have similarly
held for the buyer on grounds of nondisclosure, 5 frightened the community of real estate brokers and sellers everywhere. As a result,
the National Association of Realtors (NAR) lobbied to enact
mandatory seller disclosure laws throughout the country.6 The
1. Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
2. Id. at 674. The reputation of the house greatly impaired the resale
value of the property. Id.
3. Id. Ackley deliberately informed the general public that supernatural
forces were at work in her home. Her poltergeists were written about in a 1977

Reader'sDigest article and in the local paper in 1982. Id. The court wrote that
the "defendant is estopped to deny their [poltergeists'] existence and, as a mat-

ter of law, the house is haunted." Id.
4. Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 674. In a 3-2 decision, the Starnbovsky
court concluded that since the buyer was a New York City resident, he could not
be expected to know the legend of the house located in Nyack Village. Id. The
court reasoned that it was unfair for the seller to take advantage of the buyer's
ignorance of a condition which would not ordinarily prompt inquiry, and which
would not be discovered through reasonable diligence. Id. at 677.
5. For a discussion of the current case law regarding the issue of nondisclosure, see infra part III.
6. James D. Lawlor, Mandatory Seller Disclosure Laws, PROB. & PROP.,
July-Aug. 1992, at 34. The National Association of Realtors is an organization
that began in 1908 and is currently based in Chicago, Illinois. ENCYCLOPEDIA
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NAR's efforts have succeeded in eleven states: Alaska, California,
Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New York,. Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 7 Illinois is the most recent
state to adopt a mandatory disclosure law. 8
For most people, the purchase of a home is the single most important acquisition of one's life. 9 As a result, used home buyers
need increased protection.' 0 Although a growing number of states
OF ASS'NS: REGIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

§ 3115 (Grant J. El-

dridge ed., 1992). The NAR is comprised of approximately 800,000 members
and has an annual budget of over $5,000,000. Id. The Illinois Association of
Realtors (IAR) is affiliated with the NAR and consists of approximately 30,000
members with an annual budget of $4,000,000. Id. § 1940. Since January
1992, the IAR License Law Task Force has spent a great deal of time drafting a
model statute concerning seller disclosure. ILLINOIS AsS'N OF REALTORS LICENSE LAw TASK FORCE, SELLER DISCLOSuRE FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS (Sept. 1992).

7. Eleven states already have disclosure laws in effect: ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.70.010 (1992); CAL. Cy. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15 (West 1990); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, § 2929A (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360 (Baldwin 1992);
Code Me. R. § 330 (1991); Mo. CODE ANN., Bus. OcC. & PROF. § 16-528 (1992);
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 443 (McKinney 1993) (to be repealed Dec. 31, 1993); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 455.606-.607 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 5-20.8 (1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-517 (Michie 1992); and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 709 (West 1992).
8. The following ten states are currently considering mandatory disclosure
laws: H.B. 657, Idaho 51st Leg. 1st Sess. (1992); H.B. 5282, Mass. 177th Gen.
Court (1992); H.B. 5106, Mich. 86th Leg. (1991); S.F. 1481, Minn. 77th Leg.
Sess. (1991); S.B. 2821, Miss. Leg. Sess. (1992); S.B. 304, Ohio 119th Gen. Assembly (1992) [(enacted)]; S.B. 996, Tenn. 97th Gen. Assembly, 2nd Sess.
(1991); H.B. 51, Vt. 61st Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1991); H.B. 2122, Wash. 52d
Leg. (1992); H.B. 4608, W. Va. 70th Leg., 2nd Sess. (1992).
As of August 1992, twenty-three states had voluntary disclosure programs.
James D. Lawlor, Seller Beware: Burden of Disclosing Defects Shifting to Sellers, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 90 [hereinafter Seller Beware]. Coldwell Banker is
a real estate brokerage firm that has its own program for seller disclosure. Telephone Interview with Kathy Walgreen, Real Estate Agent, Coldwell Banker
(Oct. 8, 1992). It is the policy of Coldwell Banker not to represent a seller unless the seller completes a disclosure form provided by Coldwell Banker. Id.
9. Serena Kafker, Sell and Tell: The Fall and Revival of the Role on NonDisclosure in Sales of Used Real Property, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 57, 58 (1986)
(citing Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho 1966) as a moral foundation
for the enactment of mandatory disclosure legislation).
10. See Joel M. King, Broker Liability After Easton v. Strassburger: Let the
Buyer Be Aware, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651, 662 (1985). Although the current
real estate market appears to favor the buyer, the price of a used home remains
a substantial proportion of the typical buyer's income. Id. Thus, a used home
buyer is in need of assurances. By contrast, there is more than adequate protection for the buyer of a new home. See Joseph C. Brown, Jr., The Implied
Warranty of HabitabilityDoctrine in Residential Property Conveyances: PolicyBacked Change Proposals, 62 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1987) (discussing the role of
the implied warranty of habitability in real estate transactions). For instance,
a buyer of a new home can maintain a claim based on the implied warranty of
habitability. See Schleyhahn v. Cole, 532 N.E.2d 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding a builder liable under the implied warranty of habitability for defects in a
new home, even though those defects did not make the home literally uninhabitable). Generally, there is an implicit agreement between the parties that the
seller will convey a house that is suitable to live in, and the seller's failure to do
so is a breach of warranty. Id.
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have come to realize the significance of the purchaser's problem,"
some states overlook rather crucial elements when formulating
12
their policies and enacting their purportedly protective statutes.
This Note focuses on the formulation of a comprehensive
mandatory disclosure statute for Illinois. Part I discusses the development of the principle of caveat emptor, its evolution, and how
it has withered away in the law of real estate. Part II examines the
broker's role in a typical real estate transaction and considers how
a disclosure law would aid both buyer and broker throughout the
home buying process. Part III addresses current case law on the
issue of liability for nondisclosure. Part IV critically examines the
legislative response to the case law on mandatory disclosure. Using
California's mandatory disclosure law as a model, Part IV then proposes to modify and amend the Illinois mandatory disclosure statute based on similar statutes currently under consideration in other
states.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Origin of Caveat Emptor

Traditionally, the sale of both real property and personal property has been based on the doctrine of caveat emptor.13 The Latin
phrase first appeared on signs in ancient Roman markets that
warned "let the buyer beware." 14 The Romans understood that the
buyer had the responsibility of protecting himself from crafty
11. See Seller Beware, supra note 8, at 90 (discussing how seller disclosure
laws have come to the forefront in state legislatures throughout the country).
12. For a discussion of California's mandatory disclosure statute and the
deficiencies in the Illinois counterpart, see infra notes 143-190 and accompanying text. For instance, at first blush the California Code entitled "Disclosures
Upon Transfer of Residential Property" appears not to offer any substantial
protection. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (West 1990). The California disclosure
statute sets out the following disclaimer: "It is not a warranty of any kind by
the seller(s) or any agent(s) representing any principal(s) in this transaction,
and is not a substitute for any inspections or warranties the principal(s) may
wish to obtain." Id. This disclaimer raises the issue of whether the buyer may
sue based on a violation of the code if the facts revealed to the buyer are inaccurate. See also Robert J. Bruss, Watch Out When Buying 'As Is" House, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 25, 1992, at 1F (warning buyers of real property that an "as is" disclaimer in a real estate contract signifies that the seller makes no warranties or
representations as to the condition of the property).
13. King, supra note 10, at 652. Caveat emptor is an English common law
maxim that developed in the seventeenth century. Id. Under the maxim, the
buyer was denied any claims as to the quality of goods. Id.
14. The full Latin adage reads, "Caveat emptor, qui ignorarea non debuit

quodjus alienum emit," which is translated as "let the buyer beware, who ought

not be ignorant of the amount and nature of the interest which he is about to
buy, exercise caution." Renee D. Braeunig, Johnson v. Davis: New Liability for
FraudulentNondisclosure in Real Property Transactions,11 NOVA L. REV. 145,
146 n.9 (1986) (citing H. BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS 768 (7th ed. 1874)).
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merchants by inspecting the products he purchased. 15 The philosophy of caveat emptor carried over into the Dark Ages of Europe as a
result of the Crusades and the decline of the Catholic Church. i6 In
the wake of the Crusades and the decline of the Church's authority,
unregulated trade flourished among all the countries of the known
world, and with it the thesis that each buyer-whether he be a
merchant, middleman, or ultimate consumer-must fend for
17
himself.
Caveat emptor, as a legal maxim, was easily translated into the
law of real estate in Middle Age England since agriculture was the
sole purpose for land.1 8 In feudal Europe, the possession of land by
anyone, other than a lord or king, was a rarity. 19 In fact, by the end
of the eleventh century all land was held by the king, with others
holding under him in tenure. 20 The allodial form of ownership was
unknown in England. 2 1 The focus of real estate was on the soil
itself and not on the structure atop the soil.2 2 Caveat emptor was so
15. Id.
16. Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J.
1133 (1931). In order to instill and propagate the necessary sense of morality in
the common people, the Christian Church involved itself in commercial activities. Id. at 1138. For instance, the Church prohibited the receipt of interest on
loans, reasoning that the income came without actual work and was therefore
sinful. 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 385 (15th ed. 1986). In addition, the
Church fixed the price of certain goods in an attempt to enhance fair dealing
with unlearned buyers. Id. With the decline of the Church's power, its influence withered away allowing the markets to trade free of regulations. See also
Comment, Caveat Vendor -A Trend in the Law of Real Property, 5 DE PAUL L.
REV. 263 (1956) [hereinafter Caveat Vendor] (discussing the rise and fall of the
doctrine of caveat emptor).
17. 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 16, at 891. As a result of the
Crusades, travel became more common among various nations and cultures.
Id. Soldiers and merchants alike journeyed throughout the known world trading with one another, guided by their common sense.
18. Patricia Esser Cooper, The Wave of Seller Liability, PROB. & PROP.,
July-Aug. 1992, at 26 (noting that the central purpose of land during feudal
times was to grow produce to feed the family occupying the land, and to serve as
a source of tax for the feudal lords). In modern times, the need is less for arable
land and more for shelter. Id. at 27.
19.

See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE LAw OF

REAL PROPERTY 3-4 (West Publishing Co. ed., 1940) (explaining that after the
Norman Conquest, the king became the sole owner of all land and then transferred land to soldiers for payment of military duties). The granting of land was
considered a luxury. Id. As such, the grantees were not inclined to complain
about any defects. Id.
20. Id. at 3 (explaining that the Norman lawyers established the principle
that all land was derived from the King; and stating that by 1086 England was
divided among approximately 1,500 tenants, each owing the King some type of
service).
21. Id. at 14 (explaining that the concept of singular ownership - ownership of land not in relation to a superior - was unknown). The term "allodial"
refers to land owned "not holden of any lord or superior." BLAcK's LAw DICTION-

ARY 76 (6th ed. 1990).
22. At the outset of Anglo law a conveyance of the land included any structure built upon the land. MoYNIHAN, supra note 19, at 14. Even today, no
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ingrained in English jurisprudence that Lord Cairns in Peek v.
Guiney2 3 explained that the seller has no duty to disclose facts regardless of how "morally censurable" silence may be. 24 Accordingly, the English common law, with few demurrers, strictly
applied the doctrine of caveat emptor in the purchase of both goods
25
and real estate.
B.

The Sale of Goods and Caveat Emptor in the United States

In the United States, the doctrine of caveat emptor concerning
the sale of goods became woven into the fabric of the common law
during the industrial revolution. 2 6 At that stage of American history, society favored individualism and the frontier spirit.27 The
courts reflected society's general preference for a laissez faire economy by refusing to interfere with business ventures, and by generally holding that a purchaser must "take care of his own
'28
interests.
The first dent in the protective shield of caveat emptor came in
1906 with the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act. 29 The Uniform
Sales Act was a forthright attempt by the respective state legislatures to protect buyers from defective goods. As a result of the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act, sellers began to vouch for their
products and discovered that honesty could bring back satisfied
customers. 30 This statutory exception to the common law rule of
caveat emptor effectively emasculated the maxim as it applied to
31
the sale of personal property.
reference need be made in a deed as to the existence of a structure existing
upon the land. Id. at 15.
23. Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873).
24. Kafker, supra note 9, at 58 (citing Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377
(1873), and describing Lord Cairns' reasoning that the law of caveat emptor was
grounded in the freedom of contract).
25. Hamilton, supra note 16, at 1137.
26. Caveat Vendor, supra note 16, at 264.
27. Id. at 264. The focus of business was on pure capitalism, fueled by the
abhorrence of any governmental influence. See also Hamilton, supranote 16, at
1171 (stating that American entrepreneurs strongly supported the doctrine of
caveat emptor, believing it promoted self-reliance, sharpened acumen and
would help business and society flourish by leaving unbridled each person's
self-interested ambition).
28. See Barnard v. Kellog, 77 U.S. 383 (1870) (holding that the needs of
business are best served by utilizing the principle of caveat emptor).
29. UNIFORM SALEs ACT (1906); King, supra note 10, at 653.
30. See Caveat Vendor, supra note 16, at 264 (explaining that once sellers
stood behind their products, they realized customers would return with more
business).
31. Id. The author suggests that the exceptions to caveat emptor not only
swallowed the rule, but also pushed the law of sales to the opposite extreme of
caveat venditor, "let the seller beware." Id. at 265. See also Johnson v. Davis,
480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (stating that the law is moving to the point where a
seller must fully disclose all material facts whenever equity demands).
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C. Real Estate Law in the United States Was Not Quick to
Abolish Caveat Emptor
Though the law governing the sale of goods overcame caveat
emptor, the law of real estate contracting and conveyancing was not
so quick to abolish the maxim, 3 2 leaving purchasers of real property
unguarded by analogous protections. As recently as 1965, one commentator was moved to say that the law offers more protection to a
person buying a dog leash than it does to the purchaser of a
house. 33 Courts continued to cling to the notion that a seller had no
34
duty whatsoever to disclose anything to the buyer.
However, caveat emptor never completely shielded the seller of
real estate. The common law has always recognized exceptions to
the maxim and held sellers of real estate liable under theories of
fraud or express warranties. 3 5 Yet, these exceptions did not have a
36
far reaching effect, given the courts' narrow definition of fraud.
For instance, in Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons ManufacturingCo.,
Judge Learned Hand wrote that even if a seller of a product misled
a buyer with what Judge Hand termed "dealer's talk," fraud
was
37
not actionable unless the buyer had no chance to inspect.
32. Caveat Vendor, supra note 16, at 265.
33. See Paul G. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in
Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965) (proposing that owners of personal property have protections, like the warranty of merchantable quality, but
that real estate purchasers assume all the risks and have no recourse against
the seller).
34. The court in Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808

(Mass. 1942) summarized this attitude well. In Swinton, the buyer claimed
that the seller fraudulently failed to reveal that the house was infested with
termites. Id. at 808. The Swinton court held that the seller had no duty to
disclose the presence of the pests for the law had not "reached the point of imposing upon the frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic as this." Id.
at 809. In other words, a seller may take advantage of an uninformed buyer
regardless of fair play. Id. The necessary protections for real estate purchasers
came slowly, case by case.
35. See Richard M. Jones, Comment, Risk Allocation and the Sale of Defective Used Housing in Ohio-Should Silence Be Golden?, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 215,
217 (1991) (explaining that the common law has always acknowledged certain
exceptions to the general rule that a seller need not disclose material facts to a
buyer).
36. See Craig A. Peterson, Tort Claims by Real Estate PurchasersAgainst
Sellers and Brokers: Current Illinois Common Law and Statutory Strategies,
1983 S. ILL. U. L.J. 161, 164 (discussing how even today fraud may be difficult
to allege since many states require proof of scienter). See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977) (discussing the elements which a plaintiff must
prove to establish a prima facie case of fraud); see, e.g., Park v. Sohn, 414
N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (reversing judgment and holding in favor of defendant-builders, because plaintiff failed to prove defendants were aware that they
had built the home in violation of a zoning ordinance).
37. See Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons MFG. Co., 248 F. 853 (2d Cir. 1918)
(reasoning that since the buyer had ample opportunity to inspect the vacuum
cleaner, the seller's statements were not misrepresentations; rather they were
considered an exaggeration of the vacuum cleaner's qualities).
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The first inroad on caveat emptor as it applied to the sale of real
estate dealt with the seller's duty to disclose material facts. 38 The
courts eventually changed their rigid viewpoint on the seller's duty
to disclose in situations that involved dangerous conditions, holding
that sellers must disclose facts that might threaten a buyer's wellbeing. 39 In 1932, the Restatement of Contracts took another step in
the same direction. 40 The Restatement advocated a broad legal
duty to disclose all known facts that were crucial to the transaction. 4 1 The Restatement commentators reasoned that nondisclosure of such facts would be tantamount to mistake, thereby voiding
42
the entire contract.
The next step in modifying the rule of caveat emptor concerned
the interpretation of "reasonable diligence." 4 3 In the mid-twentieth
century, courts began to impose a duty on sellers to disclose facts
which a purchaser could not discover through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 44 For instance, if a seller were aware that the
furnace was defective and a buyer could not determine its condition
through a reasonable inspection, the seller would have a duty to
45
reveal that fact to the purchaser.
38. See Caveat Vendor, supra note 16, at 265 (stating that one of the fundamental principles of caveat emptor was that the seller had no duty to disclose
facts).
39. See Kafker, supra note 9, at 59 (explaining that when courts impose a
duty to disclose material defects, they often base their holdings on the threat
that nondisclosure poses to a buyers' safety); see, e.g., Thacker v. Tyree, 297
S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982) (finding that the seller had a duty to disclose that the
house was built on filled ground which caused the walls to crack to the point
where the house was not safe for occupation). See also Cooper, supranote 18, at
28 (explaining that although contract law may be used creatively to circumvent
caveat emptor, the rush of liability in recent times stems from actions based on
tort).
40. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 502 (1932).
41. See Caveat Vendor, supra note 16, at 265 (referring to the Restatement
of Contracts § 502 (1932) as requiring disclosure of facts that are crucial to the
transaction); see also Cooper, supra note 18 (reasoning that a buyer who is unaware of a defect which is material to the transaction may rescind the contract
based on mutual mistake, regardless of whether the seller was aware of the
defect). However, in the recent case of Harding v. Willie, 458 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1990), the buyer sought to rescind a contract for the purchase of a
house after he realized that the roof still leaked. The Hardingcourt held that
since the seller had had work done on the roof, the seller was unaware of the
problem and was, therefore, not liable for telling the buyer that the roof was
fine. Id.
42. Caveat Vendor, supra note 16, at 265.
43. Id. at 266; see, e.g., Revitz v. Terrell, 572 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990). In Revitz, the buyer based a cause of action on nondisclosure against a
broker for not revealing the actual cost of flood insurance. Id. The Florida
court of appeals held that the buyer satisfied the requirement of reasonable
diligence when the buyer inquired why neighboring homes were on stilts. Id. at
998.
44. See, e.g., id.
45. However, few courts will find a seller liable based on the seller's superior knowledge. Kafker, supra note 9; see Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507
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California took an even stronger stance on the seller's breach of
this newly-imposed duty to disclose. In 1947, a California appellate
court held that concealment would be considered fraudulent in situations where the seller refuses to reveal material facts that "are
unknown to the buyer."46 Hence, silence became the functional
equivalent of fraud. 4 7 Thus, California made it more dangerous for
a seller to remain silent by holding that the seller had not necessarily fulfilled the duty to disclose, even after the buyer had inspected
48
the house.
The common law also modified the doctrine of caveat emptor as
it applied to affirmative representations. Although courts still
charged the buyer with the duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, they declined to punish the buyer for believing the seller's misrepresentations. 4 9 In Prescott v. Brown, 50 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court took "the view that a vendor, guilty of a falsehood made with
intent to deceive, should not be heard to say that the purchaser
ought not to have believed him." 5 1 The courts afforded real estate
52
purchasers the right to rely on sellers' express assertions.
(N.D. 1985) (asserting that although there exists no fiduciary duty between
buyer and seller, it is clear that the seller is in a superior position due to the
seller's familiarity with the property).
46. See King, supra note 10, at 653 (quoting the holding in Dyke v. Zaiser,
182 P.2d 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) where the defendant-lessor induced the plaintiff-lessee to sign an eight year lease to operate a concession stand at an amusement park). In Dyke, the California Court of Appeals held the defendant liable
for fraud. The court reasoned that because the defendant was a city official, he
knew that the facility was to be shut down by the police the day after the lease
was signed, yet still made representations to the effect that the facility would
remain open for years. See also Southern v. Floyd, 80 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. Ct. App.
1954) (holding seller liable based on fraud for concealing a crack in a furnace so
as to frustrate discovery).
47. See, e.g., Dyke, 182 P.2d 344; Southern, 80 S.E.2d 490.
48. See, e.g., Dyke, 182 P.2d 344; Southern, 80 S.E.2d 490.
49. See Carol R. Goforth, Sales of Structurally Defective Homes: The Potential Liability of Sellers and Real Estate Brokers, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 450
(1988) (discussing the courts' reasoning that a buyer need not go to great
lengths to investigate a home; instead, the buyer's duty to conduct a search is
minimal). It seems clear, however, that a buyer will be held responsible for
discovering patent defects. Id.
50. Prescott v. Brown, 120 P. 991 (Okla. 1911).
51. Id. at 994.
52. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (stating that if the
buyer was justified in relying on a seller's misstatements, the buyer has a right
to damages for any pecuniary loss which resulted from the seller's purposeful or
negligent communication of false information). See Braeunig, supra note 14, at
148 (discussing how half truths are tantamount to fraud); see, e.g., Elsey v.
Lamkin, 162 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1914) (holding the seller liable for disclosing the
existence of only one of the two graveyards on the premises); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 106 (5th ed. 1984). Once a seller chose to speak,
she assumed the duty to disclose the whole truth. Id. Thus, if a buyer relied on
a prior representation and the seller acquired new information which showed
the prior representation to have been incorrect, the seller would be responsible
for failing to convey the newly-acquired truths. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1977): "A representation stating the truth so far as it goes
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In extending this protection to buyers of real estate, courts
then examined the notion of "puffing."5 3 Since an exception to caveat emptor required a misrepresentation of fact, the courts had to
address the question of whether "puffing" was truly such a misrepresentation. In Passero v. Loew, 54 the Texas Supreme Court found
that "puffing" was an exception to caveat emptor. The Passerocourt
reasoned that a seller who asserts that a house was built well,
when it truly was not, would be liable for making a misrepresenta55
tion of fact.
In addition to ruling that a seller must not lie, courts held that
any material misrepresentation, whether purposeful or not, would
allow the buyer to rescind the contract.5 6 The seller's subjective
honesty or diligence would no longer be a factor since the law would
impose the same penalty on both innocent misrepresentations and
57
more deliberate misstatements.
D.

Caveat Emptor Is a Useless Doctrine

In sum, caveat emptor does not have a ghost of a chance of remaining a viable tenet in late twentieth century jurisprudence.5 8
Courts have repeatedly demonstrated that the maxim of caveat
emptor is not appropriate in contemporary society.5 9 In light of the
but which the maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of
his failure to state additional or qualifying matter is fraudulent
misrepresentation."
53. Caveat Vendor, supra note 16, at 268. "Puffing" is defined as a seller's
exaggeration about the quality of a product for the purpose of inducing a buyer
to purchase. BLAcK's LAw DicTioNARY 1233 (6th ed. 1990).
54. See Passero v. Loew, 259 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (holding that
a seller's false representation was material where the seller asserted that the
house was well constructed and that the buyer would experience no serious
problems, when in fact the house was built on clay subsoil).

55.

Id.

56. See JOHN D. CALAMAI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS
357 (3d ed. 1987) for a discussion of how nondisclosure of a material fact in a
transaction may lead to recision of a contract.

57. Id.
58. Frona M. Powell, Mistake of Fact in the Sale of Real Property, 40 DRACE
L. REV. 91, 116 (1991). Courts today have a revived interest in minimum standards of fair dealing, reminiscent of the Church a millennium before. Id. This
is reflected in the courts' general acceptance of the implied warranty of habitability. See Grand, Implied and Statutory Warranty in the Sale of Real Estate:
The Demise of Caveat Emptor, 15 REAL EST. L.J. 44 (1986) (asserting that the
doctrine of caveat emptor should be directly confronted by way of legislation
which would require sellers of real estate to deliver a sound product for a fair
price). For a discussion of the implied warranty of habitability in real estate
transactions, see supra note 10.
59. Braeunig, supra note 14, at 147. It was always assumed that parties
dealt with one another at arm's length and that the buyer had an equal opportunity to inspect the property in question. Id. This attitude originated from
early transactions between neighbors, conducted face to face. Id. Moreover, the
parties usually were well acquainted with one another and lived in the same
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increasing complexity of real estate transactions, the law should
mandate fair and reasonable disclosure.
II.

OVERVIEW OF A

BASIC

REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION

In order to fully understand how a mandatory disclosure law
would benefit all parties in a real estate transaction, one needs to
understand the intricacies of the transaction itself. Part II of this
Note examines the role of the broker in relation to both the buyer
and the seller. Then, it explains the limited points in time at which
the buyer currently has an opportunity to inspect the real estate.

A.

The Broker As a Dual Agent

One of the central problems surrounding the average real estate transaction is that buyers expect that brokers will protect the
buyers' interests.6 0 Buyers operate under a false sense of security,
believing that real estate brokers are agents of the buyer. In Illinois, even though brokers must explain that their fiduciary duty is
to sellers,6 1 most buyers will continue to believe that the brokers
are their confidants. 6 2 Accordingly, a mandatory disclosure law,
whereby the seller and the seller's broker must reveal all material
defects and alert the buyer to the buyer's substantive rights, will
help to rouse the buyer out of a false sense of security.
The normal scenario in the sale of residential real estate insmall communities. Id. Accordingly, a seller's self-interested motivation was
lessened greatly.
60. "The legal relations of the parties must vary with the variation of the
operative facts of the particular transactions, their complexity and variation
being increased by the fact that at least three parities are always involved - a
seller, a purchaser, and a broker." CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 50, at 194 (1963).
61. Illinois law mandates that a broker who has been contacted by a prospective buyer, must inform the buyer of any agency relationship with the
seller. 225 ILCS 455/18.2 (1993) provides as follows:
Persons licensed under this Act shall disclose in writing to prospective buyers the existence of an agency relationship between the licensee and the
seller, or shall disclose in writing to sellers, or their agent, the existence of
an agency relationship between the licensee and a prospective buyer at a
time and in a manner consistent with regulations established by the
Department.
Id.
62. Jones, supra note 35, at 225. There are a number of reasons why a
buyer is lulled into a sense of security. At the preliminary stages of home buying, a buyer will seek a broker. Often, a friend of the buyer will refer the broker
to him. Id. Typically, the buyer divulges a great deal of personal information,
principally his financial status, to the broker so that the buyer may be placed in
the correct market. Id. Also, the buyer discusses his personal likes and dislikes
with the broker to further narrow the search. Id. After spending a great deal of
time with the broker - discussing personal information, being escorted to various homes, and helped in other ways - a buyer may be misled into believing
that his new-found friend is a professional who has the buyer's best interest
primarily at heart.
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volves two brokers: (1)the listing broker, 63 who obtains the listing
from the seller and principally represents and deals with the seller;
and (2) the cooperating broker, also known as the selling or showing
broker, who deals almost exclusively with the buyer. Both brokers,
however, are primarily agents of the seller. 64 Once either broker
brings a buyer who is ready, willing and able to buy, either on the
listing terms or on other terms acceptable to the seller, the broker
65
has essentially "earned" her commission.
B.

Opportunities to Inspect

In the typical real estate transaction, the buyer has only two
opportunities to conduct an inspection of the property: after signing the sales contract and immediately prior to closing. However,
63. See RAYMOND J. WERNER & ROBERT KRATOVIL, REA.L. ESTATE LAW
§ 10.11 (10th ed. 1992) (defining the broker who obtains the listing from the
seller as the listing broker). The first thing a seller normally does when she
intends to sell her home is to contact a real estate broker and enter into a listing
agreement. Id. Then, the listing broker will usually enter the listing in a multiple listing service (MLS). Id. The MLS takes the information about the
seller's particular property and disseminates it throughout a given geographic
region to other brokers, known as cooperating brokers. Id. If a particular broker is a member of an MLS, she is obligated to put the property into the multiple listing bureau within one or two days after obtaining the seller's listing. Id.
Otherwise, she will not be able to continue her participation in the association.
Id.
64. Lately, however, because the buyer normally believes that the cooperating broker is his personal agent, the cooperating broker has been held to have a
fiduciary duty to the buyer. Stefani v. Baird & Warner, 510 N.E.2d 65 (ll. App.
Ct. 1987). In Stefani, the defendant-broker prepared a purchase offer on behalf
of the plaintiff-buyers for a home located in Chicago. Id. at 67. Offers and
counter-offers were exchanged between plaintiffs and the home owners. Id.
While negotiations continued, the defendant contacted another couple to
purchase the house who offered more money than the plaintiffs. Id. The defendant never informed plaintiffs that another couple had made an offer. Id.
The court found that the cooperating broker had a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs to disclose that there are other potential purchasers. Id. Thus, the cooperating broker paradoxically seems to have a dual allegiance.
65. See Hallmark & Johnson Properties, Ltd. v. Taylor, 559 N.E.2d 141 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (finding for the brokers based on the rule that a broker's commission is earned once a ready, willing, and able buyer is produced; notwithstanding the fact that the failure of buyer in question to appear at closing was due to
his arrest by federal law enforcement agents).
However, if a contract is subject to a condition, the broker's commission is
technically earned only after that condition is fulfilled. See How to Draft a Real
Estate Brokerage Agreement, PRAc. REAL EST. LAw., Mar. 1987, at 45-54. For
example, one condition might require that a buyer first obtain a mortgage; another condition might require that the house pass a building inspection. Under
these circumstances, although the broker often does not receive her commission
until closing, she has earned her commission once the condition occurs. Id.
In some listing contracts, the broker is entitled to a commission from the
seller even if the deal falls through. Id. Therefore, a prudent attorney representing the seller will insert a clause into the brokerage contract stating that
the broker will earn and receive a commission only if the deal closes. See also
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967) (establishing a three
part test as to when a broker earns his commission).
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as this section demonstrates, many buyers do not avail themselves
of these opportunities.
At the contract drafting stage, a mandatory disclosure law
would be an invaluable tool. The drafting of a real estate contract is
the point in the transaction at which the buyer's attorney can best
protect her client.66 Real estate contracts usually include provisions on such matters as the purchase price, earnest money, marketable title, a survey of the property itself, and attorney approval
clauses. 6 7 It is becoming increasingly common for the sales contract to also provide the buyer an opportunity to have an expert
inspect the property, and to make the contract contingent on the
building inspector's approval of the property. Within a short time
after signing the contract, the buyer's expert will inspect the structural integrity of the property; and absent disapproval by the in68
spector, the contract becomes unconditional.
However, a buyer does not always take advantage of this opportunity to have an expert inspect the property. When an inspection is provided for in the contract, the broker who drafts the form
contract frequently allows only a short period of time for the inspection. 69 Conducting the inspection within the period provided requires a degree of diligence on the buyer's part that the buyer
frequently cannot meet. Therefore, it is evident that a disclosure
law-including a mandatory inspection-will facilitate the consummation of the contract.
66. "The contract of sale is the key to the real estate transaction. It is the
critical document which fixes the fundamental rights and obligations of the parties from the time it is signed through the closing of title and, in many cases,
even beyond." ARTHuR S. HoRN, RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTITIONER IN NEW JERSEY § 1.1 (2d ed. 1989).
67.

"Attorney approval" clauses are attached to the contract when the con-

tract itself is filled out by the broker. See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Ty-

son, 203 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) (holding that brokers are permitted to
fill in form real estate contracts). An example of an attorney approval clause
reads as follows:
Attorney Review: The parties agree that their respective attorneys may review and make modifications other than stated purchase price mutually
acceptable to the parties within four (4) business days after the date of the
Contract acceptance. If the parties do not agree and written notice thereof
is given to the other party within the time specified then this Contract will
become BY ALL PARTIES HERETO AND THIS CONTRACT WILL BE IN
FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.
Courts have held that attorneys can withhold approval of a completed and
signed contract for any reason, provided that the attorney acts in good faith.
See Indoe v. Dwyer, 424 A.2d 456 (N.J. 1980); Trenta v. Gay, 468 A.2d 737 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983).
68. WERNER & KRATOVIL, supra note 63, § 10.11. Disapproval frequently
must be personally delivered to the seller within a predetermined time frame.
At this point, the broker will have earned her commission and thereafter the
contract must be performed as written. Id.
69. Id. Frequently, real estate contracts allow the buyer three to five days
to have an inspection completed. For a discussion of mandatory inspections, see
infra part IV.C.3.a.
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Once a buyer obtains a mortgage commitment from a lender, a
title insurance company must conduct a title search to ascertain the
present condition of the title, starting with the first conveyance of
the land.70 If a substantial objection in the title commitment
makes the title unmarketable, the buyer's attorney will inform the
other side that the deal cannot close. 7 1 Once the title commitment
is issued and the buyer's attorney is convinced that the title is fundamentally marketable, the buyer's
attorney informs the seller's at72
torney that the deal may close.
Fundamentally, at closing the seller gives a deed to the buyer
conveying title to the land, and the buyer pays money or other consideration to the seller. 73 Immediately prior to the closing, it is cus70. See WERNER & KRATOVIL, supra note 63, § 15.06. A few decades ago,
lawyers actually went to the Recorder's Office to search the official books as to
the condition of title. Id. Today, because there have been so many transactions
over such short periods of time, lawyers in urban areas no longer conduct title
searches. Id. This function is now performed by organizations such as Chicago
Title Insurance, Ticor Title, Intercounty Title, Attorney's Title Guarantee
Fund, to name a few. Id. § 15.01.
A title insurance company will search the records (theoretically from the
first U.S. land grant to the present time) and determine who is presently in
title. Id. The title searcher will also determine what liens, conditions, utility
easements, and other title concerns affect the land. Id. The title insurance
company commitment, once issued, does not rid the title of these objections or
exceptions. Id. It simply informs the prospective buyer what those exceptions
are. Id. After having seen the title commitment, the buyer's attorney must
decide whether the title is "marketable." Id.
The title commitment to the land has nothing to do with the structural
integrity of the building. Instead it deals with, for example, whether there is a
possibility of reverter, whether there are any liens against the land, whether or
not there are private or public easements that affect the land, and other such
title questions. Id.

71.

WERNER

& KRATOVIL, supra note 63. Furthermore, consider that if the

buyer had agreed in the contract to take the property subject to a substantial

exception (e.g., to an easement for a private road), the buyer has no right to
back out of the sale. In other words, when the buyer signs a contract, the buyer
agrees to take title subject to certain exceptions and limitations. The more exceptions and limitations the buyer agrees to in the contract, the less chance she
has of rescinding the sales contract once the title insurance commitment is finally issued.
72. Id.
73. Id. § 14.01. The buyer's money comes from a combination of funds, i.e.,
from his own savings and from monies borrowed from the mortgage lender. Id.
In days gone by, the lenders would conduct the closing, issue a check to the
seller, and pay off liens of an ascertainable amount. Currently, lenders do not
actually conduct the closing. Id. Instead, they delegate the job to an officer of
the title company that issued the title insurance commitment. Id. Therefore,
the title company wears two hats; one of title searcher and insurer, and another
of deal closer. Id.
Brokers are usually present at the closing and at that time hand the keys
to the buyer. Upon conclusion of the closing, which takes about two hours, the
buyer owns the property free of all liens except his own mortgage. After the
sale has finally closed and a few more weeks have elapsed, the recorded deed
will be mailed back to the buyer's attorney along with the new title policy. Id.
This completes a normal residential real estate transaction.
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tomary for the buyer to re-inspect the premises to be sure that all
items of personal property listed in the contract remain on the
premises, and that the house is as structurally sound as it was on
the day the contract was signed.
A mandatory disclosure law should once again come into play
at this juncture of the transaction. A complete disclosure law would
require the seller to make up-to-date disclosures of defects that occurred during the executory period of the contract. 74 Occasionally,
the buyer re-inspects the property before closing and realizes a defect has surfaced that either ought to be remedied, or is so crucial
that it justifies canceling the sale. However, by this time the buyer
is doubtlessly so psychologically committed to purchasing the house
that she is likely to dismiss even potentially major problems and
will deem practically anything acceptable. Therefore, the seller
should have the duty to recertify that the property has not deteriorated-ordinary wear and tear excepted-from the time of the initial disclosure to the date of closing. The mandatory disclosure law
should also provide that the seller's recertification, being supported
by separate consideration, would survive the closing and be separately actionable by the buyer. This would obviate the normally
strong-and otherwise conclusive-presumption that all pre-closing contractual commitments are merged into the deed and expire
at closing.
III.
A.

CURRENT CASE LAw

Brokers Now Assume the Same Liability as Sellers

With the demise of caveat emptor, a disappointed purchaser
may plead a number of causes of action against a seller. Buyers
today may base suits on fraud, 7 5 breach of express or implied warranty, 7 6 and consumer protection acts, 7 7 to name a few. 78 However, the variety of remedies available to buyers is not the issue
that unnerves members of the NAR. Rather, the brokers' fraying
nerves are attributable to the fact that buyers are beginning to seek
74. See infra part IV.C.2 (discussing a modification to Illinois' existing proposal that would provide for up-to-date disclosure of newly discovered defects).
75. Jones, supra note 35, at 217 (citing Grant v. Wrona, 662 S.W.2d 227
(Ky. Ct. App. 1983) as an example of where a buyer based a cause of action on
fraud).
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing Koltz v. Underwood, 563 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) as an
example of where a buyer based a cause of action on a consumer protection act);
see, e.g., Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857, 859 (Del. 1975).
78. Jones, supra note 35, at 217. See Chapman v. Hosek, 475 N.E.2d 593
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that a purchaser's cause of action for fraud would
stand where the broker failed to disclose that the property flooded, and observing that although information about the flooding was on public record, the public record alone did not put the buyer on sufficient notice to extinguish the
buyer's suit).
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relief for faulty transactions from the brokers themselves. 79
One reason for the brokers' concern is that often the seller,
alone, does not have the funds to adequately compensate the buyer.
So, as a practical matter, buyers-and their attorneys-look to the
deep pockets of the real estate broker.8 0 Buyers' attorneys realize
that many mistakes and wrongdoings on the part of the broker are
covered by the broker's professional insurance. 8 '
Courts today understand that the broker plays a crucial role in
residential transactions. 8 2 Not only do both parties rely on the broker for guidance, but the broker also has a substantial personal in83
terest, given that she derives her income from the sale.

Consequently, many courts hold both the seller
and the broker lia84
ble for failure to make adequate disclosure.
For instance, in Lingsch v. Savage8 5 a California appellate
court held both the broker and seller liable for failure to disclose
defects. In Lingsch, the buyer sued both the seller and the broker
alleging that the failure to disclose material facts amounted to a
$5,000 fraud.8 6 The Lingsch court explained that the seller had a
duty to disclose all facts materially affecting the value of the property.8 7 Failure to comply with the duty was actual fraud. 8 Moreover, the court reasoned that since the defendant broker had a
personal interest in the sale, he too was a party to the transaction.8 9 Therefore, the broker, who was actually aware of material
defects, was jointly and severally liable for damages. 90
Thus, by the 1980s, both the seller and broker were left unprotected by caveat emptor and could be held liable under numerous
causes of action. The buyer could sue either the seller or the broker
92
for intentional misrepresentation, 9 1 innocent misrepresentation,
79. See infra text accompanying notes 97-114.
80. Jones, supra note 35, at 219.
81. Id. at 220.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. King, supra note 10, at 655.
85. Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
86. Id. at 203. That is, the property was truly worth $5,000 less than it was
represented to be, due to the fact that the property was in a state of disrepair.
87. Id. at 204.
88. Id. at 205.
89. Lingsch, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974) (where a
home was infected with roaches, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the
modem view of concealment, holding that the failure to reveal a substantial
defect which the buyer could not reasonably have discovered on his own
amounts to fraud).
92. See, e.g., Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 763 (Alaska 1982) (holding the
broker liable under the doctrine of innocent misrepresentation for repeating the
seller's false statements).
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negligent misrepresentation, 93 breach of express warranty, breach
of implied warranty of habitability, 94 strict liability, 9 5 and statu96
tory consumer trade acts.
B.

Easton v. Strassburger Has Extended the Liability of Brokers

By the early 1980s, many brokers believed that by placing additional duties on brokers and sellers alike the courts had tipped
the scales in the buyers' favor.9 7 In February of 1984, a California
appellate court added fuel to this controversial fire with its decision
in Easton v. Strassburger.98 The effects of the Easton decision
raced through the country like wildfire, causing the NAR to assemble its forces and push for legislation. 99
Easton generated alarm because it dramatically expanded the
scope of broker liability.100 Easton involved the sale of a one acre
plot of land on which stood a 3,000 square foot house, a swimming
pool, and a guest house. 1 1 The plaintiffs bought the property in
1976 for $170,000.102 Shortly after the sale, in 1977 and again in
1978, massive earth movements substantially damaged the property. 10 3 Experts attributed the problem to improperly compacted
1 4
fill under the property.
At trial it was revealed that the sellers previously experienced
two slides, took corrective measures, but withheld that information
from their brokers. 10 5 Moreover, the evidence also revealed that
the brokers were aware of many clues, such as netting on a slope by
the house and uneven floors in the guest house which, in California,
93. See, e.g., Richmond v. Blair, 488 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(holding the broker liable for not disclosing known defects of the property being
sold).
94. See Peterson v. Hubschman, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. 1979) (establishing
an implied warranty of habitability).
95. E.g., Gauerke v. Rozga, 332 N.W.2d 804 (Wis. 1983) (finding the real
estate broker strictly liable to the purchaser of property for misrepresentations
regarding the acreage and amount of road and river frontage); Schipper v.
Levit, 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965).
96. Staurt Knowles, Note, Real Estate Brokers Liability for Failure to Disclose: A New Duty to Investigate, 17 PAC. L.J. 327, 332 (1985).
97. Braeunig, supra note 14, at 162 (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625

(Fla. 1985) (Boyd, C.J., dissenting) wherein the dissenting justice cautioned
that soon sellers may become guarantors of the property -

placing the entire

duty of inspection on the seller - leaving the buyer without responsibility).
98. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
99. See Lawlor, supra note 6, at 34 (stating that the NAR support for man
datory
rather
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

disclosure laws is a direct result of Easton,yet not entirely altruistic, but
a means to minimize the broker's liability).
Knowles, supra note 96, at 336.
Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 386.
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is evidence that slides have taken place.' 0 6 In short, regardless of
the sellers' actions, the brokers understood10the
importance of these
"red flags," yet did not inform the buyers. 7
The buyers grounded their cause of action against the brokers
in negligence.' 0 8 The Easton court based its reasoning on the decisions of two earlier California cases, Lingsch and Cooper v.
Jevne.10 9 The Easton court held that, in addition to the duty to
disclose known facts, a broker has an affirmative duty to the buyer
to conduct a reasonably diligent inspection of the property. 110 The
duty imposed exists regardless of whether or not the buyer could
have discovered the defect on her own. Hence, the broker need not
have actual knowledge of material defects to be liable for failure to
disclose such defects. The court noted that this new development
was implicit in the earlier disclosure requirement."' If the duty to
disclose is to have any meaning at all, a broker must be responsible
for inspecting the property. 1 12 Otherwise, the law will be rewarding a broker for remaining ignorant. 1 13 More importantly, the
court wanted to protect the buyer from an unethical seller or broker
by forcing both the seller and the broker to provide sufficient, accurate information which would enable the buyer to make an edu114
cated decision.
C.

Case Law in Illinois

Illinois has not yet taken the dramatic step that California took
in Easton. Nonetheless, a definite movement exists both in the
country and in Illinois to similarly increase the scope of the broker's
liability. 115 The development of broker liability in Illinois is compa106. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
107. Id.
108.

See id. (instructing the jury about negligent misrepresentation and sim-

ple negligence, since the buyers voluntarily dismissed the actions for fraudulent
concealment and intentional misrepresentation).
109. Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
110. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
111. Id. (citing Brady v. Carman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) to

illustrate that a real estate agent's duty to discover problems is an implicit duty
reflected in the law). The Brady court wrote that the broker was obligated, as a
professional, to obtain information about the easement and make full disclosure
of the burdens it imposed on the land.
112. Id. at 388.
113. See id. (reasoning that if brokers were only required to reveal known
defects, brokers would be sheltered by their ignorance).
114. Id.
115. There is a recent trend to impose more strict duties on real estate brokers. John R. Ardaugh, Note, Mandatory Disclosure: The Key to Residential
Real Estate Brokers' Conflicting Obligations, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201, 203
(1985) (citing and describing cases in footnote 16: see, e.g., Bevins v. Ballard,

655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982) (holding the real estate broker liable to the purchasers for making material representations to the purchasers as to the condition of
a well on unimproved property, even though the representation was innocently

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 27:155

rable to the experience of other states.
In the past 20 years, the Illinois General Assembly has demon1 16
strated a strong tendency in favor of protecting the purchaser.
From 1980 through 1986, disappointed used home buyers could
base a cause of action against brokers on two statutes: the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act (Consumer
Fraud Act), 117 and the Illinois Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen
118
License Act (Real Estate License Act).
In 1980, an Illinois appellate court for the first time made a
connection between the sale of real estate and the Consumer Fraud
Act in Beard v. Gress.119 The purchasers in Beard sued both the
sellers and the sellers' broker, alleging misstatements regarding
the interest on the mortgage-which had been assumed by the purchasers-and the length of time the property had remained unsold. 120 On appeal, the Beard court found that the broker was not
liable for common law fraud since the plaintiffs did not allege that
the broker knew or should have known of the mistake. 121 However,
made); Zichlin v. Dill, 25 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1946) (allowing a non-principal buyer to
recover against a broker who represented that the property could not be
purchased for less than $5,000, when in fact the broker bought it for $4,500 and
resold it to the buyer for a $1,000 profit); Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person
Fin. Ctr., Inc., 686 P.2d 262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (defining brokers' status as to
prospective purchasers with respect to known or discoverable defects); Provost
v. Miller, 473 A.2d 1162 (Vt. 1984) (stating that a broker will be found negligent
if the broker passes information to the buyer that the broker knows or has rea-

son to know may be untrue); First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton
Realty, Inc., 574 P.2d 1211 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that the selling broker negligently represented to the prospective buyer that three parcels of property were included in the listing when in fact there was only one); Gauerke v.
Rozga, 332 N.W.2d 804 (Wis. 1983) (finding the real estate broker strictly liable
to the purchaser of property for misrepresentations regarding the acreage and
amount of road and river frontage); Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981)
(holding that the real estate broker who skimmed over the lease should have
known its terms and had a duty to inform the buyers that the length of said
lease was less than that represented to the buyers)).
116. See Peterson, supra note 36, at 180 (quoting from Duhl v. Nash Realty,
429 N.E.2d 1267, 1277 (111. App. Ct. 1981) wherein the Illinois appellate court
noted that the Consumer Fraud Act "indicates a decisive move on the part of
the Illinois Legislature to enact broad protective coverage for consumers from
the many types of deceptive or unfair selling and advertising techniques used
by businesses.").
117. 815 ILCS 505/2 (1992).
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 262 (1990) (repealed 1984) replaced by 225
ILCS 455/1 (1992) (amended 1992, 225 ILCS 455/13.2); see Daniel R.Hofstetter,
Illinois Real Estate Broker Liability: Developments Over the Past Decade, ILL.
B.J., Mar. 1991, at 126. In 1986 the legislature eliminated a private cause of
action under the Illinois Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen License Act that
had been granted in Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849
(Ill. 1982). Today, an Illinois statute provides that no private right of action for
damages may be based on the act. 225 ILCS 455/32 (1992).
119. Beard v. Gress, 413 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
120. Id. at 449.
121. See id. (recalling that state of mind is an element of common law fraud).
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the Beard court did hold the broker liable under the Consumer
Fraud Act for his innocent misrepresentation.
Thus, the holding in Beard was twofold. First, the Illinois
court held that the Consumer Fraud Act applied to real estate
transactions. 1 22 Second, the court held that neither the broker's
state of mind nor the diligence of the purchaser in checking the accuracy of the broker's representation was material to the cause of
action. 123 Accordingly, in Beard, the Illinois appellate court held
that the broker's failure to exercise due care in providing information to the buyer was a basis for liability under the Consumer
124
Fraud Act.
A 1982 amendment to the Consumer Fraud Act modified the
result of Beard.125 The amendment provided that in order to be
held liable, the broker must have actual knowledge of the inaccuracy when relaying the information. 12 6 However, the 1982 amendment addresses neither concealment nor nondisclosure.
The
amendment only deals with affirmative communications which are
false or misleading. 127 In 1982, the Illinois appellate court in Duhl
v. Nash Realty12s noted that the Consumer Fraud Act demonstrates clearly the intent of the Illinois legislature to expand the
rights of consumers beyond the common law to protect buyers
against the deceptive business practices of unscrupulous brokers
129
and sellers.

122. See id. at 452 (concluding that now section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act
is broadened to allow buyers of real estate to sue for violations of that section).
123. See id. (following the precedent of Grimes v. Adlesperger, 384 N.E.2d
537 (Ill. 1978) where the Illinois Supreme Court held that neither the mental
state nor the diligence of the injured party to check the accuracy of the misstatements was material to grounding a cause of action under the Consumer
Fraud Act; in Grimes, the sale of a restaurant was rescinded because the MLS
given to the buyer contained flagrantly inaccurate data regarding previous
gross sales).
124. See Peterson, supra note 36, at 179 (suggesting that Beard, 413 N.E.2d
448, should not be interpreted to hold a broker strictly liable).
125. 815 ILCS 505/10(b) (1992).
126. See Hofstetter, supra note 118, at 127 (quoting language from the 1982
amendment which provides that nothing in the Consumer Fraud Act would apply to the "communication of any false, misleading or deceptive information,
provided by the seller of real estate located in Illinois, by a real estate salesman
or broker licensed under The Real Estate Brokers License Act, unless the salesman or broker knows of the false, misleading or deceptive character of such
information.").
127. Peterson, supra note 36, at 179.
128. Duhl v. Nash Realty, 429 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981).
129. Peterson, supra note 36, at 181 (quoting language from Duhl, 429
N.E.2d at 1277).
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LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO CASE LAW

A. Legislation Is the Best Solution
In the last ten years, the potential liability of sellers and real
estate brokers has grown considerably.130 Brokers assert that the
traditional disclaimers in contract and tort law no longer serve as
protection.131 The NAR estimates that two-thirds of the suits
brought against sellers and brokers involve nondisclosure
problems. 13 2 The average award granted to buyers has doubled
since 1984 to $9,800.133 A statute is needed which can curb the
escalating liability against sellers and brokers while protecting
buyers from shady transactions.13 4 The goal of protecting buyers
who are at a disadvantage in dealing with unscrupulous brokers is
an end worthy of legislation.' 3 5 Mandatory disclosure laws are the
best means by which to offer complete protection to the buyer, while
remaining fair to the broker.
The business world has already embraced disclosure laws for
commercial real estate transactions. 136 In commercial transactions
the parties involved are generally more familiar with the complexities of a real estate contract, yet the law requires that a disclosure
form be used to aid buyers of commercial property. 137 It only
makes sense that similar laws should apply in residential
transactions.
Disclosure laws put a buyer on notice as to what the law considers "material."' 3 8 Disclosure laws also state explicitly that the
130. Lawlor, supra note 6.
131. Kafker, supra note 9. But see Diedrich v. N. Ill. Publishing Co., 350
N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (excusing the seller from liability based in
part on the "as is" provision drawn up by the purchaser himself); see also Dee v.
Peters, 591 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding fast to the doctrine of caveat
emptor by refusing to find the seller liable for his silence in disclosing defects).
132. ILLINOIS AS'N OF REALTORS LICENSE LAw TASK FORCE, SELLER DIscLosuRE, FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, (Sept. 1992) [hereinafter SELLER
DiscLOsuRE REPORT].

133. See H. Jane Lehman, Lobby Effort To Focus on Home Defects; Real Estate Agents Seek Seller-DisclosureLaw, THE WASH. POST, July 6, 1991, at El
(stating that the NAR began lobbying for mandatory disclosure laws as a result
of the trend to hold the seller and broker liable).
134. For a discussion of the ideal mandatory disclosure statute for Illinois,
see infra part IV.C.
135. Knowles, supranote 96, at 339. See also Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388
(discussing how buyers' inclination to rely on the real estate brokers' expertise
makes them susceptible to being misled).
136. Frona M. Powell, The Seller's Duty to Disclose in Sales of Commercial
Property, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 245 (1990).
137. Id.
138. "Material" is defined as a condition or representation that is so significant to the transaction as to be deemed almost necessary and have the result of
influencing the party to whom it is made. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 976 (6th ed.
1990).
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broker is the agent of the seller,' 39 thus, putting the buyer on
guard. These laws create a higher standard of care for brokers,
which is more consistent with the ethical duties already imposed on
them.' 40 Disclosure laws will reduce litigation and will reward and
encourage honesty by all parties involved in the sale of residential
real estate. 1 4 ' For instance, a well drafted disclosure law would
prohibit a broker from simply repeating a seller's false statement
and hiding behind her own ignorance. Although every buyer should
look out for her own best interests, disclosure laws will enable a
buyer to rely on the assumption that a seller and broker will not
knowingly sell a house that is in a less than habitable condition.
Accordingly, although legislation may not be a panacea, it is the
best solution for protecting the residential buyer. 142
B.

Illinois' Mandatory Disclosure Statute

Senator James "Pate" Philip introduced a real estate disclosure
bill to the 87th General Assembly on April 7, 1992.143 With a few
modifications, the bill became law in July 1993, and will take effect
on October 1, 1994.144 Although the changes made between the
introduction of the bill and the enactment of the mandatory disclosure law were an improvement, the legislature did not go far
enough. In order for the law to have the most significant impact,
139. Although Illinois already requires the broker to disclose her fiduciary
relation to the seller, a mandatory disclosure law will insure that a buyer fully
understands her position. For a discussion of the Illinois statute requiring the
broker to disclose her fiduciary relation to the seller, see supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
140. See Knowles, supra note 96 (citing from Easton 152 Cal. App. at 104, in
which the court reasoned that since brokers are professionals, they should
make use of their education); see also NATIONAL Ass'N OF REALTORS, INTERPRETATION OF THE CODE OF ETHIcs (1992) (discussing the codes that a broker is
charged to uphold).
141. See SELLER DISCLOSuRE REPORT, supra note 132 (asserting that disclosure forms reduce the possibility of lawsuits).
142. Some believe the solution lies in eliminating the dual agency of real
estate brokers by statute. The law would require every buyer to find her own
broker. Hence, every real estate transaction would involve two brokers - one
for the seller and one for the buyer. Proponents of such a measure argue that
commercial real estate transactions typically employ two brokers, so residential
sales should as well. In a commercial real estate transaction, the buyer pays
her broker either a flat fee or on an hourly basis. As a result, the buyer's broker
will not hesitate to disclose all defects since her fee is not dependent on a sale.
While requiring the buyer to have her own broker eliminates the misconception
that the seller's broker represents the buyers interests, such a law is inefficient.
A buyer's broker might reveal a material defect to dissuade Buyer A, while
Buyer B must still hire his own broker to conduct the same search and hopefully discover the same defect. The multiplicity of buyers and buyer's brokers
would encourage sellers and their brokers to conceal defects, hoping that one of
the many potential buyers' brokers will fail to discover a particular defect.
143. S.B. 1714, Inl. 87th Gen. Assembly (1992).
144. Residential Real Property Disclosure Act, Act of July 20, 1993, P.A. 111
(effective Oct. 1, 1994).
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the conflicting interests of the buyer, the seller, and the real estate
broker must be carefully weighed and balanced. 145 The focus of
this section is to compare and contrast the basic components of Illinois' new statute on real estate disclosure with both California's
disclosure statute and the 1992 draft of the disclosure law.
1. Using California as a Model
California's mandatory disclosure statute was the first
mandatory disclosure statute enacted and has served as a guide for
most other states. 14 6 California's statute consists of approximately
sixteen provisions, eight of which contain the basic ideas that are
the foundation of most other states' laws. The crucial provisions
include those dealing with the following: applicability of the article, 14 7 exceptions, 148 time of delivery, 149 errors and omissions,' 5 0

145. See King, supra note 10, at 662 (explaining how the California Legislature reacted to Easton by enacting California Senate Bill No. 453 which went in
the opposite direction of Easton and statutorily decreased a broker's potential
liability).
146. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 709 (West 1992); H.B. 5106, Mich. 86th Leg.
(1991).
147. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1102 (West 1990) sets forth the applicability of the
mandatory disclosure statute and provides the following:
Except as provided in Section 1102.1, this article applies to any transfer by
sale, exchange, installment land sale contract, as defined in Section 2985,
lease with an option to purchase, any other option to purchase, or ground
lease coupled with improvements, of real property, or residential stock cooperative, improved with or consisting of not less than one nor more than
four dwelling units.
Id.
148. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1102.1 (West 1990) sets forth the different types of
real estate transactions that are exempt from the statute and provides as
follows:
Non-application of article. The provisions of this article do not apply to the
following: (a) Transfers which are required to be preceded by the furnishing
to a prospective transferee of a copy of a public report pursuant to Section
11018.1 of the Business and Professions Code and transfers which can be
made without a public report pursuant to Section 11010.4 of the Business
and Professions Code. (b) Transfers pursuant to court order, including, but
not limited to, transfers ordered by a probate court in administration of an
estate, transfers pursuant to a writ of execution, transfers by any foreclosure sale, transfers by a trustee in bankruptcy, transfers by eminent domain, and transfers resulting from a decree for specific performance. (c)
Transfers to a mortgagee by a mortgagor or successor in interest who is in
default, transfers to a beneficiary of a deed of trust by a trustor or successor
in interest who is in default, transfers by any foreclosure sale after default,
in an obligation secured by a mortgage, transfers by a sale under a power of
sale or any foreclosure sale under a decree of foreclosure after default in an
obligation secured by a deed of trust or secured by any other instrument
containing a power of sale, or transfers by a mortgagee or a beneficiary
under a deed of trust who has acquired the real property at a sale conducted pursuant to a power of sale under a mortgage or deed of trust or a
sale pursuant to a decree of foreclosure or has acquired the real property by
a deed in lieu of foreclosure. (d) Transfers by a fiduciary in the course of the
administration of a decedent's estate, guardianship, conservatorship, or
trust. (e) Transfers from one co-owner to one or more other co-owners. (f)
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Transfers made to a spouse, or to a person or persons in the lineal line of
consanguinity of one or more of the transferors. (g) Transfers between
spouses resulting from a decree of dissolution of marriage or a decree of
legal separation or from a property settlement agreement incidental to
such a decree. (h) Transfers by the Controller in the course of administering Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 1500) of Title 10 of Part 3 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. (i) Transfers under Chapter 7 (commencing with
Section 3691) or Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 3771) of Part 6 of
Division 1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. (j) Transfers or exchanges to
or from any governmental entity.
Id.
149. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1102.2 (West 1990) sets forth when and how the disclosure form must be delivered and provides as follows:
Delivery of required written statement from transferor to prospective
transferee; indication of compliance with article; disclosures delivered after offer to purchase; time to terminate. The transferor of any real property
subject to this article shall deliver to the prospective transferee the written
statement required by this article, as follows: (a) In the case of a sale, as
soon as practicable before transfer of title. (b) In the case of transfer by a
real property sales contract, as defined in Section 2985, or by a lease together with an option to purchase, or a ground lease coupled with improvements, as soon as practicable before execution of the contract. For the
purpose of this subdivision, "execution" means the making or acceptance of
an offer. With respect to any transfer subject to subdivision (a) or (b), the
transferor shall indicate compliance with this article either on the receipt
for deposit, the real property sales contract, the lease, or any addendum
attached thereto or on a separate document. If any disclosure, or any material amendment of any disclosure, required to be made by this article, is
delivered after the execution of an offer to purchase, the transferee shall
have three days after delivery in person or five days after delivery by deposit in the mail, to terminate his or her offer by delivery of a written notice
of termination to the transferor or the transferor's agent.
Id.
150. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1102.4 (West 1990) sets forth the liability imposed for
the delivery of inaccurate information and provides as follows:
Errors, inaccuracies, or omissions of information delivered; liability of
transferor; delivery of information by public agency; delivery of reports or
opinions prepared by experts. (a) Neither the transferor nor any listing or
selling agent shall be liable for any error, inaccuracy, or omission of any
information delivered pursuant to this article if the error, inaccuracy, or
omission was not within the personal knowledge of the transferor or that
listing or selling agent, was based on information timely provided by public
agencies or by other persons providing information as specified in subdivision (c) that is required to be disclosed pursuant to this article, and ordinary care was exercised in obtaining and transmitting it. (b) The delivery of
any information required to be disclosed by this article to a prospective
transferee by a public agency or other person providing information required to be disclosed pursuant to this article shall be deemed to comply
with the requirements of this article and shall relieve the transferor or any
listing or selling agent of any further duty under this article with respect to
that item of information. (c) The delivery of a report or opinion prepared by
a licensed engineer, land surveyor, geologist, structural pest control operator, contractor, or other expert, dealing with matters within the scope of the
professional's license or expertise, shall be sufficient compliance for application of the exemption provided by subdivision (a) if the information is
provided to the prospective transferee pursuant to a request therefore,
whether written or oral. In responding to such a request, an expert may
indicate, in writing, an understanding that the information provided will
be used in fulfilling the requirements of Section 1102.6 and, if so, shall indicate the required disclosures, or parts thereof, to which the information
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subsequent information, 15 1 good faith, 15 2 and failure to comply. 153
The heart of the California statute is the disclosure form itself.154 The California form sets forth four major requirements.
being furnished is applicable. Where such a statement is furnished, the
expert shall not be responsible for any items of information, or parts
thereof, other than those expressly set forth in the statement.
Id.
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1990) sets forth that after the disclosure
form is delivered, newly acquired information need not be disclosed and provides as follows:
Information subsequently rendered inaccurate; required information unknown or not available. If information disclosed in accordance with this
article is subsequently rendered inaccurate as a result of any act, occurrence, or agreement subsequent to the delivery of the required disclosures,
the inaccuracy resulting therefrom does not constitute a violation of this
article. If at the time the disclosures are required to be made, an item of
information required to be disclosed is unknown or not available to the
transferor, and the transferor or his or her agent has made a reasonable
effort to ascertain it, the transferor may use an approximation of the information, provided the approximation is clearly identified as such, is reasonable, is based on the best information available to the transferor or his or
her agent, and is not used for the purpose of circumventing or evading this
article.
Id.
152. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.7 (West 1990) sets forth the requirement of good
faith in completing the form and provides as follows:
Good faith required. Each disclosure required by this article and each act
which may be performed in making the disclosure, shall be made in good
faith. For purposes of this article, "good faith" means honesty in fact in the
conduct of the transaction.
Id.
153. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1102.13 (West 1990) sets forth the amount of damages
one will be liable for violating the statute and provides as follows:
Failure to comply with article; transfer not invalidated; damage. No transfer subject to this article shall be invalidated solely because of the failure of
any person to comply with any provision of this article. However, any person who willfully or negligently violates or fails to perform any duty prescribed by any provision of this article shall be liable in the amount of
actual damages suffered by a transferee.
Id.
154. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (West 1990) sets forth the disclosure form itself
and provides as follows:
Disclosure form.
The disclosures required by this article pertaining to the property proposed
to be transferred are set forth in, and shall be made on a copy of, the following disclosure form:
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT CONCERNS THE REAL PROPERTY SITUATED IN THE CITY OF _,
COUNTY OF
, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DESCRIBED AS
. THIS STATEMENT IS A DISCLOSURE OF THE
CONDITION OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 1102 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS OF
, 19_.
IT IS NOT A WARRANTY OF ANY KIND BY
THE SELLER(S) OR ANY AGENT(S) REPRESENTING ANY PRINCIPAL(S) IN THIS TRANSACTION, AND IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR
ANY INSPECTIONS OR WARRANTIES THE PRINCIPAL(S) MAY
WISH TO OBTAIN.
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First, the form requires the seller to disclose known existing defects
I
COORDINATION WITH OTHER DISCLOSURE FORMS
This Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement is made pursuant to Section 1102 of the Civil Code. Other statutes require disclosures, depending
upon the details of the particular real estate transaction (for example: special study zone and purchase-money liens on residential property). Substituted Disclosures: The following disclosures have or will be made in
connection with this real estate transfer, and are intended to satisfy the
disclosure obligations on this form, where the subject matter is the
_
_
_
_
same:_
(list all substituted disclosure forms to be used in connection with this
transaction)
II
SELLER'S INFORMATION
The Seller discloses the following information with the knowledge that
even though this is not a warranty, prospective Buyers may rely on this
information in deciding whether and on what terms to purchase the subject
property. Seller hereby authorizes any agent(s) representing any principal(s) in this transaction to provide a copy of this statement to any person
or entity in connection with any actual or anticipated sale of the property.
THE FOLLOWING ARE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE
SELLER(S) AND ARE NOT THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE
AGENT(S), IF ANY. THIS INFORMATION IS A DISCLOSURE AND IS
NOT INTENDED TO BE PART OF ANY CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
BUYER AND SELLER.
Seller -is -is not occupying the property.
A. The subject property has the items checked below:
-Range
-Oven
-Microwave
_Dishwasher
__Trash Compactor
-Garbage Disposal
_Washer/Dryer Hookups
_Window Screens
__Rain Gutters
_Burglar Alarms
_Smoke Detector(s)
_Fire Alarm
_T.V. Antenna
_Satellite Dish
-Intercom
_Central Heating
_Central Air Conditioning
_Evaporator Cooler(s)

__Wall/Window Air Conditioning
-Sprinklers
_Public Sewer System
Septic Tank
Sump Pump
Water Softener
_Patio/Decking
Built-in Barbecue
Gazebo
Sauna
-Pool
Spa
_Hot Tub
Security Gate(s)
_Automatic Garage Door
Number Remote Controls
Carport Pool/Spa Heater:-Gas -Solar
Electric Water Heater:
_Gas _Private Utility

Water Supply:City
Well
-Bottled
Gas Supply:Utility
Other
Gas
220 Volt Wiring in_____ Fireplace(s) in
Exhaust Fan(s) in_
(approx.) Other:Age:
Starter__. Rooffs): Type:
Are there, to the best of your (Seller's) knowledge, any of the above that are
not in operating condition? __.Yes __No.
If yes, then describe. (Attach additional sheets if necessary ):.
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B. Are you (Seller) aware of any significant defects/malfunctions in any of the
following? .. Yes -No. If yes, check appropriate space(s) below.
_Interior Walls _Ceilings .Floors
-Exterior Walls _Insulation
-Roof(s) - Windows Doors _Foundation _Slab(s) -Driveways -Sidewalks __Walls/Fences - Electrical Systems
Plumbing/Sewers/Septics
-Other Structural Components (Describe: __ _) If any of the above is
checked, explain. (Attach additional sheets if necessary):- --C. Are you (Seller) aware of any of the following:
1. Substances, materials, or products which may be an environmental hazard
such as, but not limited to, asbestos, formaldehyde, radon gas, lead-based
paint, fuel or chemical storage tanks, and contaminated soil or water on the
subject property
_Yes _No
2. Features of the property shared in common with adjoining landowners,
such as walls, fences, and driveways, whose use or responsibility for maintenance may have an effect on the subject property
__Yes
-No
3. Any encroachments, easements or similar matters that may affect your
interest in the subject property
_Yes
-No
4. Rooms additions, structural modifications, or other alterations or repairs
made without necessary permits
_Yes _No
5. Rooms additions, structural modifications, or other alterations or repairs
not in compliance with building codes
._Yes _No
6. Landfill (compacted or otherwise) on the property or any portion thereof
_Yes _No
7. Any settling from any cause, or slippage, sliding, or other soil problems
_Yes
No
8. Flooding, drainage or grading problems
__Yes _No
9. Major damage to the property or any of the structures from fire, earthquake, floods, or landslides _Yes _No
10. Any zoning violations, nonconforming uses, violations of "setback" requirements __Yes _N
11. Neighborhood noise problems or other nuisances __Yes _No
12. CC&R's or other deed restrictions or obligations __Yes -No
13. Homeowners' Association which has any authority over the subject
property
__Yes _No
14. Any "common area" (facilities such as pools, tennis courts, walkways, or
other areas co-owned in undivided interest with others)
__.Yes _No
15. Any notices of abatement or citations against the property
__Yes __No
16. Any lawsuits against the seller threatening to or affecting this real
property
__Yes _No
If the answer to any of these is yes, explain. (Attach additional sheets if
necessary.):__ Seller certifies that the information herein is true and
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in any fixtures or appliances on the property. 15 5 Second, the form
requires the seller to disclose known defects in the structure of the
home. 156 Third, the form requires the seller to disclose defects in
the property or matters affecting the property itself. 157 Fourth, the
form requires both the listing broker and the cooperating broker to
conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of
correct to the best of the Seller's knowledge as of the date signed by the
Seller.
Seller
Seller

Date
Date

_
_

III

AGENTS INSPECTION DISCLOSURE (To be completed only if the Seller is
represented by an agent in this transaction.) THE UNDERSIGNED, BASED
ON THE ABOVE INQUIRY OF THE SELLER(S) AS TO THE CONDITION
OF THE PROPERTY AND BASED ON A REASONABLY COMPETENT
AND DILIGENT VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ACCESSIBLE AREAS OF
THE PROPERTY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THAT INQUIRY, STATES
THE FOLLOWING: ....
Seller)
Date

-

Agent (Broker Representing
By
(Please Print)

(Associate Licensee or Broker-Signature)
-IV
AGENTS INSPECTION DISCLOSURE (To be completed only if the agent
who has obtained the offer is other than the agent above.)
THE UNDERSIGNED, BASED ON A REASONABLY COMPETENT AND
DILIGENT VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ACCESSIBLE AREAS OF THE
PROPERTY, STATES THE FOLLOWING:
Agent (Broker obtaining the Offer)
By

Date

__

(Please Print) (Associate Licensee or Broker-Signature)
V
BUYER(S) AND SELLER(S) MAY WISH TO OBTAIN PROFESSIONAL ADVICE AND/OR INSPECTIONS OF THE PROPERTY AND TO PROVIDE
FOR APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS IN A CONTRACT BETWEEN BUYER
AND SELLER(S) WITH RESPECT TO ANY ADVICE/INSPECTIONS/DEFECTS. I/WE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS
STATEMENT.
Seller
Buyer
Seller
Buyer

Date
Date
Date
Date

Agent (Broker Representing Seller)
By

Date

(Associate Licensee or Broker-Signature)
Agent (Broker obtaining the Offer)
By

Date

__

(Associate Licensee or Broker-Signature)
A REAL ESTATE BROKER IS QUALIFIED TO ADVISE ON REAL ESTATE.
IF YOU DESIRE LEGAL ADVICE, CONSULT YOUR
ATTORNEY.
Id.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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the property. 158 However, the disclosure form states clearly that
none of the information disclosed constitutes a warranty by the
seller or broker, that the form is not part of the sales contract, and
15 9
that the buyer is encouraged to use an expert inspector.
2.

ContrastingIllinois'Act

Illinois' mandatory disclosure law, entitled the Residential
Real Property Disclosure Act (Act), 160 is similar to California's statute in form and substance. The Act consists of thirteen sections
which cover most of the issues discussed in the description of California's statute. The Act, however, is missing one central ingredient that California's law includes. Illinois' real estate disclosure
form, entitled the Residential Real Property Disclosure Report (Disclosure Report), 16 1 does not require the real estate agents to sign
the form after making an inspection of the property. The California
statute requires the signature of two brokers, both the listing and
cooperating broker, if both are involved in the sale of the property.162 Curiously, the 1992 Illinois bill required the signature of at
least one real estate agent. 163 It seems that the lobbyists for the
NAR persuaded the legislature to shield the real estate industry
both from potential liability and from the responsibility to examine
a house before selling it. The agent inspection disclosure provision
in the 1992 draft required those agents who represented the seller
to make a "reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection" of
the property.1 6 4 That section of the Disclosure Report would have
had the effect of barring brokers and agents from blissfully relying
on the representations of unscrupulous, misinformed, or ignorant
sellers. As the law exists now in Illinois, real estate brokers and
agents are free to sing the praises of a house without signing their
name to its true worth.
In addition, the Illinois Disclosure Report does not require the
seller to reveal whether former federal or state ordnance locations
were ever situated near the property as does the law in California.
The California statute expressly requires a seller to reveal if nearby
land was formerly used for military training. 165 California enacted
158.
159.
160.

Id.

§ 1102.6 (West 1990).
Residential Real Property Disclosure Act, Act of July 20, 1993, P.A. 111
CAL. CirV. CODE

(effective Oct. 1, 1994).
161. P.A. 111, § 35 (1993).
162. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (West 1990).
163.

S.B. 1714, § 30 (1992).

164. Id.

165. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1102.15 (West 1990) sets forth that a seller, who has
actual knowledge, must disclose if a nearby location was once a military facility
which may contain explosives, and provides in pertinent part:
[T]he seller of residential real property subject to this article who has actual knowledge of any former federal or state ordnance locations within the
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this provision in response to a 1983 incident in which two eightyear-old boys were killed when an abandoned mortar shell exploded
while the boys were playing on a hillside near their newly acquired
home. 166 A similar provision might be appropriate in Illinois since
the Clinton administration has chosen to close a number of bases in
Illinois, such as Fort Sheridan and the Glenview Naval Airbase,
which will presumably be sold to developers, and may very well contain dangerous munitions.
3. Comparing the Act with the 1992 Draft
The Illinois legislature made a number of advances with the
statute after Senator Philip first introduced the idea of a
mandatory disclosure law in 1992. In general, the approved draft is
shorter and easier to understand. More importantly, the legislature added a few provisions that enhance the Act.
The Disclosure Report itself is simple and requires the seller to
answer twenty-two questions to the best of her knowledge. 16 7 The
legislature made some notable improvements to the 1992 Disclosure Report. Specifically, the legislature followed California's example by asking questions of the seller pertaining to the existence
of radon, lead paint, lead pipes, and asbestos-all very common
materials in homes over 20 years old.16 8 As enacted, the disclosure
report also asks whether the drinking water is safe; whether termites exist in the home or have previously caused structural damage; and whether there are underground storage tanks on the
property.169 The foregoing are all concerns which the 1992 draft
overlooked.
neighborhood area shall give written notice of that knowledge as soon as
practicable before transfer of title ....
[Ordnance location is defined as] an
area once used for military training purposes which may contain potentially explosive munitions.
Id.
166.

See Maureen Fan, Sitting on a Powder Keg, L.A.

TIMES,

Jan. 23, 1989,

pt. at 1. A group of small boys were playing on a hillside near their homes in
Tierrasanta, California, when one discovered a World War II mortar round. Id.

A second boy unknowingly banged the round on a rock and detonated it, instantly killing two boys and injuring a third. Id. The incident enraged the
community who demanded that the Tierrasanta local government warn resi-

dents that they live atop a World War II artillery range. Id. The article notes
that people who buy homes in Tierrasanta will be warned of the danger due to a
state law which requires full disclosure of former ordnance locations. Id.
167. P.A. 111, § 35 (1993).

168. See id. (requiring sellers to disclose pertinent environmental information just as California's law requires). A number of towns in the northern suburbs of Chicago have warned their residents that the drinking water, which is
carried through lead pipe, contains lead. The towns advise residents to run the
water for two minutes each day before drinking to wash out the stagnant water
that may have been contaminated overnight. The Note author believes information of this sort should be disclosed to potential home buyers.

169. Id.
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The rest of the Act saw improvements as well. The legislature
added a definitions section 170 and a provision clarifying that the
Act is to apply only to used residential real estatel 71-since another
statute applies to the sale of new homes. 172 To their credit, the
legislature made two other additions to the bill worth noting. First,
the statute wisely limits all suits arising from the statute to one
year from the point of receipt of the disclosure form. 173 Second, the
statute requires that the buyer receive the Act itself along with the
disclosure form. 17 4 This will have the effect of educating the buyer
175
and putting her on equal footing with the seller.
4. Lost in the Transition
Although the enacted statute is an improvement as compared
to the 1992 draft, a few ideas were lost in transition. The Disclosure Report is unfortunately missing an entire section, contained in
the proposed report, 176 pertaining to common items found in and
around most homes. The bill's original Disclosure Report questioned the seller about those items which a buyer could not reasonably evaluate by a visual inspection; items one would have to
actually use to ascertain if they were defective. 177 Some of the fifty
items listed on the proposed Disclosure Report which the seller was
supposed to comment on included an oven, dishwasher, rain gutters, burglar alarms, sump pump, smoke detectors, and water
heater. 178 The enacted Disclosure Report also eliminated a question contained in the bill1 79 asking whether there are currently any
lawsuits which might affect the property.
C.

Modifications to the Act

This section suggests changes that should be made to the Act
based on provisions in the mandatory disclosure statutes and pending bills of other states. This section, first, discusses the deficien170. Id. § 5.
171. Id. § 15(9).
172. P.A. 111, § 35 (1993).
173. See id. § 60 ("No action for violation of this Act may be commenced later
than one year from the earlier of the date of possession, date of occupancy, or
date of recording of an instrument of conveyance of the residential real
property.").
174. See id. § 65 ("A copy of this Act, excluding Section 35, must be printed
on or as a part of the Residential Real Property Disclosure Report form.").
175. The requirement that an actual statute be tendered to purchasers has
been employed in many landlord-tenant transactions. For instance, in Chicago,
the Residential Landlord-Tenant Ordinance must be attached to all leases.
CHICAGO, ILL., CODE ch. 5.12.010-.200. The ordinance has been in effect for
years and has proven very effective.
176. S.B. 1714, § 30, II.A (1992).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 30, II.C.14 (1992).
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cies in the Act in relation to the bills of other states; second, this
section discusses modifications which should be considered based
on those other statutes; and, third, this section proposes amendments that should be added to the Act in order to more fully accomplish the legislature's goals.
1.

Deficiencies

One of the central faults with the Act is that it attempts to placate both the buyer and seller, but does not do enough for either.
For purposes of this Note it is assumed that the Illinois General
Assembly intended the Act to outline the duties of the parties involved, to protect the buyer from the unscrupulous, and to shield
brokers and sellers from needless liability. However, the Act takes
too many unnecessary steps to accomplish this. Illinois chose to
follow California's lead in requiring that the Disclosure Report be
delivered to the buyer before the signing of the contract.' 8 0 The
Illinois Act further provides that if the seller does not deliver the
Disclosure Report prior to the signing of the contract, the buyer has
the option to terminate her offer. 18 1
At first glance, this provision seems reasonable. However, the
Illinois statute provides little incentive to encourage the seller to
produce the disclosure form on time. On the one hand, section 20 of
the Act demands that the disclosure form be tendered before the
contract is signed.' 8 2 On the other hand, section 40 explains that if
180. P.A. 111, § 20 (modeling CAL. CrV. CODE § 1102.2 (West 1990), supra
note 149).
181. P.A. 111, § 40. Section 40 provides as follows:
If a material defect is disclosed in the Residential Real Property Disclosure
Report delivered to a prospective buyer after acceptance by the prospective
buyer of an offer or counter-offer made by a seller or after the execution of
an offer made by a prospective buyer that is accepted by the seller for the
conveyance of the residential real property, then the prospective buyer
may, within 3 business days after receipt of that report by the prospective
buyer, terminate the contract or other agreement without any liability or
recourse except for the return to prospective buyer of all earnest money
deposits or down payments paid by prospective buyer in the transaction.
The right to terminate the contract, however, shall no longer exist after the
conveyance of the residential real property. For purposes of this Act the
termination shall be deemed to be made when written notice of termination
is personally delivered to at least one of the sellers identified in the contract or other agreement or when deposited, certified or registered mail,
with the United States Postal Service, addressed to one of the sellers at the
address indicated in the contract or agreement, or, if there is not an address contained therein, then at the address indicated for the residential
real property on the report.
A prospective buyer shall have no right to terminate the contract or
other agreement under this Act if the report is delivered before the prospective buyer enters into an agreement for the conveyance, lease, or other
transfer of the residential real property.
Id.
182. Id. § 20. Section 20 provides as follows:
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the seller tenders the disclosure form after the contract is executed
and material defects are discovered, the buyer has the option to
back out of the contract within three days.'8 3 Thus, it is possible
that an unscrupulous seller may forego delivering the Disclosure
Report before signing the contract, and then provide the Disclosure
Report days before the closing. From a practical viewpoint this is
too late to be of any value, because by this time the buyer is legally,
financially, and, most importantly, psychologically committed to
84
the purchase.1
Another major shortcoming of the Act is that it allows the seller
and her broker to remain silent about subsequently discovered defects.1 8 5 Section 25 states that the seller need not correct any inaccuracy on the form if she discovers a defect after it was delivered to
the buyer.' 8 6 This provision might encourage both the seller and
the broker to initially review the condition of the property in a cursory manner, then claim the defects occurred after the initial disclosure.' 8 7 The Act should compensate for this oversight.
Lastly, section 55, which deals with the seller's failure to comply with the Act, should be modified.' 8 8 It is a typical example of
the legislature's inability to reach an effective compromise. Section
55 leaves the buyer with only a fraud or negligence cause of action. 18 9 Thus, the buyer's only right once she closes is to sue for
damages.' 90 The buyer is stuck with the property.
2. Modifications
The Illinois General Assembly can improve the Residential
Real Property Disclosure Act, and thereby accomplish its legislative
goals more effectively by incorporating certain provisions used in
A seller of residential real property shall complete all applicable items in
the disclosure document described in Section 35 of this Act. The seller
shall deliver to the prospective buyer the written disclosure statement required by this Act before the signing of a written agreement by the seller

and prospective buyer that would, subject to the satisfaction of any negotiated contingencies, require the prospective buyer to accept a transfer of the
residential real property.

Id.
183. P.A. 111, § 40 (1993).
184. See supra part II.B (explaining that buyers will often be so deep into the
deal by the last stages of the transaction that defects then disclosed will be
dismissed, whereas they would not have been acceptable earlier).
185. P.A. 111, § 25 (1993).
186. See id. ("The seller is under no obligation to amend the disclosure document after its delivery to a prospective buyer .... ").
187. "Where ignorance is bliss, 'Tis folly to be wise." THOMAS GRAY, ON A
DIsTANT PROSPECT OF ETON COLLEGE, Stanza 10 (1742).
188. P.A. 111, § 55 (1993).
189. Id.
190. Section 40 affirmatively sets forth that "The right to terminate the contract, however, shall no longer exist after the conveyance of the residential real
property." P.A. 111, § 40 (1993).
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other states. First, the Illinois General Assembly can clarify the
ambiguity in section 20, which deals with the time of delivery of the
disclosure report, 19 1 by following Kentucky's example. The Kentucky legislature avoids misleading buyers by requiring that the
disclosure form be available when the seller enters into the listing
contract. 192 Since the listing agreement is one of the first steps in
the transaction, 9 3 all known defects will be disclosed from the
beginning.
The Delaware bill goes a step further.' 9 4 Delaware provides
that a copy of the disclosure form must be provided to all prospective buyers or their agents before the buyer even makes an offer.195
This provision is truly "buyer friendly." Providing the disclosed information to every prospective buyer eliminates the possibility that
the buyer will be drawn into the deal, only to be confronted later
with serious problems. Illinois should amend the Act to require
that a written disclosure statement be delivered to a prospective
buyer before he tenders an offer; for if a buyer is fully informed
before she presents an offer, the deal is more likely to go through
saving the time, money, and effort of all parties involved.
Second, Illinois should adopt Delaware's provision on subsequently discovered defects. 196 Section 25 of the Illinois Act expressly relieves the seller from any obligation to reveal defects
discovered after the initial disclosure. 19 7 Whereas the Delaware
statute requires the seller to update the disclosure report with any
significant changes that occur throughout the transaction. 198 Since
actual disclosure is one of the aims of a mandatory disclosure law,
Illinois should add a provision similar to that of the Delaware
statute.
Third, the Illinois General Assembly should alter section 55 of
the Act.199 Section 55 does away with a protective recourse for the
buyer. As a result of section 55, the buyer may no longer sue for
rescission of the deed. 20 0 Thus, the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act seems to exude policy but no protection. Since it is pre191. P.A. 111, § 20 (1993).
192.

H.B. 570, Ky. Reg. Sess. (1992) (enacted) provides in part that "[t]he

form shall be completed and signed by the seller at the time of listing for sale."
Id.
193. For a discussion of the initial stages of a real estate transaction, see
supra note 63.
194. H.B. 642, Del. 136th Gen. Ass. (1992).
195. Id. The Delaware bill provides in part that, "a Seller transferring residential real property shall disclose, in writing, to the Purchaser ...all material
defects of that property that are known at the time the property is offered." Id.
196. Id.
197. P.A. 111, § 25.
198.
199.

H.B. 642, Del. 136th Gen. Assembly (1992).
P.A. 111, § 55 (1993).

200. See also supra note 189 and accompanying text for the buyer's recourse.
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sumed that a legislature does not enact meaningless laws, the
language of section 55 must be changed so that a buyer, offended by
a seller's breach of the statute, is afforded at least a basic contract
or warranty cause of action that will survive the closing. Again, the
Delaware bill should serve as guidance. The Delaware bill provides
that the disclosure form itself becomes part of the contract. 20 1 Consequently, if either the seller or the broker materially fails in their
duty, the buyer will have a contract cause of action on which to base
a suit.
3.

Additions to the Illinois Act

In order to fully accomplish the goal of placing the buyer on an
equal footing with the seller, the Note author recommends that two
provisions be added to the Illinois Act. This section then discusses
the matters that, in fairness to the seller, should never be disclosed.
a.

Mandatory Inspection of Older Homes

The Illinois General Assembly should add a mandatory inspection provision to the Act. The provision would provide that all used
residential homes of a certain age must be examined by a licensed
home inspector. 20 2 The inspection would take place after the parties enter into the contract and the cost would be borne by the
3
seller.20
201. Presumably the disclosure form will not be merged into any later deed.
The doctrine of merger states that all matters relating to title are absorbed in
the deed. See WERNER & KRATOVIL, supra note 63, § 10.11 (discussing the doctrine of merger). Therefore, the buyer may not complain about questions of title
once she accepts the deed at closing. Id.
202. See King, supra note 10, at 662 (discussing the possibility of a
mandatory housing inspection provision for California). In the case of newer
homes that are not subject to the mandatory inspection provision because they
do not exceed the requisite age, the broker should have the duty of alerting the
buyer to the benefits of inspection. Id. at 664. The broker should inform the
buyer about the items that are normally inspected and should explain the warranty coverage that inspection provides. Id. Once the buyer understands the
benefits of inspection he must either agree to have the inspection conducted or
he must sign a waiver, relieving the broker of liability for all unknown defects
that may come to light in the future. Id.
203. Requiring an inspection at this time is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, an inspection conducted at this stage occurs early enough in the
transaction so that the prospective buyer may learn about essential aspects of
the property before becoming too deeply involved, and can rescind the contract
with minimal discomfort. Second, the inspection occurs late enough so that the
seller knows that the prospective buyer is seriously interested in the house
before it is inspected. The seller may not wish to go through the annoyance of
an inspection unless the buyer is willing to purchase on terms acceptable to the
seller. The seller may also not wish to subject her home to possible damage
from the inspection without some manifest interest on the part of the buyer.
Lastly, practice has shown that when voluntary inspections take place today,
they are conducted at this stage.
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The mandatory inspection would be limited to certain important aspects of construction. Since a house is a complex "product"
and an inspector's time is costly, 20 4 the examination would be re-

stricted to elements that a layman could not learn on her own. For
example, the electrical system, plumbing system, and the soundness of a home's foundation are all aspects that the average buyerand presumably the average seller as well-could not discover
independently.
The inspector would be legally responsible for the warranties
made on the condition of the house. 20 5 The inspection report would
be signed by the expert and delivered to both parties. Once the
buyer accepts the report from the inspector, the broker and the
seller would no longer be liable for defects that were raised in the
report. 206 Since the expert would be made liable for his own errors
or omissions, his conclusions would not be influenced by whoever is
paying his fee. 20 7 Moreover, since present Illinois law does not re-

quire home inspectors to carry insurance, this provision would en20 8
courage buyers to retain experts who are adequately insured.
204. The seller should pay for the inspection. The contract between buyer
and seller normally provides that the seller is responsible for the cost of the title
search, which discloses to the buyer the quality of the property's title. Analogously, the seller should also pay for the inspection, which informs the buyer as
to the home's structural integrity. Both the title search and the inspection are
devices for the potential buyer to ascertain the present state of the property.
205. See King, supra note 10, at 663 (discussing legal responsibilities of inspectors who make warranties on the condition of the house).
206. Id. at 664. A provision excusing brokers and sellers from liability where
an expert is involved is contrary to current Illinois case law. Mitchell v.
Skubiak, 618 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In Mitchell, a husband and wife

bought a home in 1987 and hired a home inspector to insure that it was free

from defects. They discovered problems in the home after they had closed the
deal. The defects complained of were not obvious when the plaintiffs inspected
the home two months prior. More importantly, the defects were not discovered
by the hired home inspector.
Plaintiffs sued the seller for misrepresentation, concealment, and non-disclosure, and the inspection company for negligence. Id. at 1015. The trial court
dismissed plaintiffs' count against the sellers reasoning that plaintiffs could not

have reasonably relied on sellers' representations since plaintiffs hired an expert. The appellate court disagreed. The appellate court held that as a matter
of law employing an expert will not bar claims against the seller. Id. at 1020.
207. Id.
208. Since Illinois law does not require home inspectors to carry insurance,
the buyer must be alerted to that fact and given the opportunity to hire qualified inspectors. See J. Linn Allen, Home Inspectors Stay Busy, But Who's Inspecting Them?, CH. TRs., July 19, 1992, at C1 (explaining Illinois does not
regulate its home inspectors, and many inspectors do not carry professional insurance). The article discusses the situation of an Illinois buyer who purchased
a home in a western suburb of Chicago. Id. The buyer hired an inspector who
determined that the 1930-dwelling was free from major defects. Id. After closing, the buyer hired an electrician to do minor electrical work and noticed that
the wiring was both illegal and extremely dangerous. Id. The buyer was forced
to spend in excess of $10,000 to correct the danger. Id.
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In addition to delivering the inspection report to both the buyer
and the seller, the report should be recorded in the County Recorder's Office. The purpose of this step is to protect any future
buyer if the present deal collapses. Once the document is recorded,
it will appear on all future title searches. 20 9 Knowing that the title
search will reveal previous inspection reports, a seller will be inclined at the outset to disclose the contents of all previous reports to
potential buyers. Of course, the sales contract should provide that
a buyer may back out if a previous inspection-brought to light by a
title search-reveals a material problem. Analogous to the buyer's
right to rescind upon evidence that the title is unmarketable, the
buyer should have the right to terminate a contract if a previously
recorded inspection report shows material defects in the property. 210 Divulging the results of all previous inspections will also
save the time of experts who make subsequent inspections by showing these experts what to look for.
In sum, a mandatory inspection provision would accomplish
two purposes. First, it would relieve the broker and seller from liability for unknown defects in the sale of all used homes, and, second, it would fully educate the buyer about the true condition of the
home.
b. Disclosing Material Elements that Don't Affect the Physical
Condition of the Home
The Illinois statute should require disclosure of certain material elements regarding the marketability of a home that are unrelated to its physical condition. As approved, the Act does not have a
provision that requires disclosure of existing noise problems and
other nuisances as did the 1992 draft. 2 11 However, Illinois law expressly condones the failure to disclose that a former occupant of
the property was infected with the HIV-AIDS disease or that the
property was the site of an egregious occurrence. 2 12 Although pub209. See How to Draft a Real Estate BrokerageAgreement, supra note 65, at
47 (describing title searches).
210. See id. (discussing title searches and the buyer's right to rescind the
sales contract where title is determined unmarketable).
211. S.B. 1714, Ill. 87th Gen. Assembly (1992) § 30 (requiring seller to disclose whether the neighborhood is susceptible to noise problems or other nuisances in part II.C of the disclosure form). For a discussion of non-physical
factors that the seller currently need not disclose, see Mary Maguire, Speak No
Evil, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1992, § 8, at 3. But see Paula C. Murray, AIDS,
Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Disclose?, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (1992), arguing that certain elements should not impose liability on sellers and brokers.
212. 225 ILCS 455/31.1 (1993) sets forth that no liability will be imposed on
a broker for refusing to disclose that a former occupant had the AIDS disease or
that the property was the site of an egregious occurrence, and provides as
follows:
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lic policy prohibits discrimination against those with the AIDS virus, the author contends that the potential buyer has a right to
2 13
know if the premises were the site of a serious criminal action.
Aside from such important public policy concerns as the AIDS epidemic, there is a need to disclose certain other non-physical
2 14
matters.
Therefore, the disclosure form should include a section pertaining to non-physical conditions that substantially affect the value of
a home. 2 15 In addition to the provision that requires disclosure of
nuisances in a neighborhood, the form should require disclosure of
the safety of the neighborhood, 2 16 the quality of nearby schools, 2 17
2 18
and the fair market value of homes in the general area.
No cause of action shall arise against a licensee for the failure to disclose
that an occupant of that property was afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or that the property was the site of an act or occurrence which had no effect on the physical condition of the property or its
environment or the structures located thereon.
Id.
213. For instance, the buyer should have a right to know if the home was
used as a "crack house," or was the cite of a murder or suicide. The purpose for
disclosing such conditions in a mandatory disclosure statute is to avoid the rude
awakening a buyer would surely experience after closing, upon learning that
such an occurrence had indeed taken place. See, e.g., Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d
672; for an example of an egregious occurrence, see supra note 4 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261 (1983) (finding that the
seller had a duty to disclose the material fact that multiple murders had taken
place on the premises ten years prior, because the occurrence affected the market value of the property and the livability of the house). Undoubtedly, a buyer
would learn of these matters from her new neighbors. It is grossly unfair to
keep such information hidden, thus forcing the buyer to accept a condition to
which she may be diametrically opposed.
214. Interview with Joan M. Kelly, Sales Assoc. for Baird & Warner, in
Glenview, Ill. (Oct. 24, 1992). Mrs. Kelly believes that in all fairness buyers
have a right to know whether a particular house was the site of such occurrences as murder and suicide.
215. As professionals, brokers are acutely aware of the characteristics of the
surrounding neighborhoods. Maguire, supra note 210. Forcing a buyer to discover non-physical factors on her own for any property in which she is interested wastes a great deal of the buyer's time. Again, if the buyer does not
discover significant non-physical concerns before she moves in, she most certainly will discover them after she moves in. But after a buyer moves in, leaving would be too impractical and ascertaining damages would be very difficult.
216. The safety of any given locality is difficult to ascertain from a visual
examination. In addition, an out-of-state buyer will have no notion as to a
neighborhood's safety. Requiring disclosure of criminal activity in the area will
justifiably aid all buyers.
217. The disclosure form should explain which schools are available, the distances and the modes of transportation. The quality of the schools in the neighborhood is often the single most important factor in a couples decision to
purchase a particular house. Maguire, supra note 210.
218. The broker knows the prices for recent sales in the area. Interview with
Joan M. Kelly, supra note 213. The MLS gives the broker the prices of all
homes bought and sold in any area. For a discussion of the MLS, see supra note
63. Just as the broker advised the seller in setting the list price, the broker
should assist the buyer in evaluating the fairness of the price. If the buyer
knew the intricacies of the market, she could discover this information herself
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c. Certain Elements Should Never Be Disclosed
Although some non-physical conditions should be disclosed,
certain non-physical characteristics should never be disclosed. For
reasons of public policy, a seller or a broker should never answer
questions concerning AIDS 2 19 or a neighborhood's ethnic
makeup. 220 For reasons of fairness to the seller, the Illinois statute
should not require disclosure of facts that would unjustifiably affect
the market price of the property. 22 1 In general, the only non-physical elements that should be disclosed are those that will affect the
living environment for future owners. Elements that merely serve
as an unjust bargaining tool, or are considered unfair as a matter of
public policy, should never be disclosed by the seller or broker.
CONCLUSION

Although the modifications and additions proposed by this
Note might not offer relief to Mr. Stambovsky, or buyers similarly
situated, the changes better insure that buyers of used residential
real estate will be afforded protection. This Note has outlined the
trend toward protecting consumers of real property by way of legislation. However, Illinois should not simply follow the trend, but be
a trend-setter. Illinois' mandatory disclosure law should be a distillation of the best ideas demonstrated throughout the country.
It is submitted that the proposals in Part IV of this Note balance the interests of all parties involved. The recommendations educate both sides as to their rights and duties and, thus, put the
buyer an on equal footing with both the seller and the broker. To
disregard the suggestions set forth herein would render the Act just
another statute and leave the buyer without a soul to turn to but
the ghosts in his attic.
John H. Scheid, Jr.

via the MLS or by personally researching the sales prices of nearby homes at
the recorder's office.
219. For a discussion of the effects of 225 ILCS 445/31.1 (1993) on disclosure
law in Illinois, see supra note 211 and accompanying text. From a public policy
standpoint, the Illinois General Assembly has expressed its intention to protect
AIDS victims from discrimination. Id.
220. Interview with Joan M. Kelly, supra note 213. Mrs. Kelly asserts that
real estate agents will not answer any questions regarding the ethnic makeup
of a neighborhood, for fear of violating real estate licensing guidelines or fair
housing laws.
221. For instance, the seller's reason for moving should never be disclosed
(e.g., divorce, lost job, or relocation). The reason for not revealing such concerns
is that a buyer could then use this information as a tool to lower the price
unjustly.

